Close call for this skier on East Groundhog Peak, also known as Captain’s Chair, in Alaska’s Kenai Mountains who triggered an avalanche and ended up in an uncontrolled headfirst 1,200 vertical feet descent.
The skier sustained serious injuries in the slide and emergency medical services were called for a rescue. An Air National Guard helicopter arrived on scene 5 hours later and the man was taken to the hospital where he is recovering from his injuries.
Read the full accident report from Chugach National Forest Avalanche Information Center below:
Chugach National Forest Avalanche Information Center Accident Report:
Date: Fri, January 31st, 2025
Summary: One skier caught, carried, and injured.
East Groundhog Peak – Accident Report
Also referred to as Captain’s Chair, Kenai Mountains, Alaska
Location: East Groundhog Peak
Lat/Lon: 60.680667 N, -149.275246 W
Date: January 31, 2025 time: 13:30
Report by: Chugach National Forest Avalanche Center (CNFAC)
Contact: staff@chugachavalanche.org, website: ChugachAvalanche.org
Avalanche Summary
A skier triggered an avalanche on East Groundhog Peak (also known as Captain’s Chair) on Friday afternoon. The skier was the second set of tracks on slope. The skier was caught and carried roughly 1200 vertical feet, sustaining serious injuries. A second party riding in the area helped initiate and maintain communications with emergency medical services while the rest of the members from the skier’s party provided medical care. The skier was evacuated by helicopter at approximately 18:45.
Avalanche Information
Type: Soft Slab
Problem/Character: Wind Slab
Crown Depth: 12-60”
Width: 100’
Vertical Run: 1200’
Trigger: Skier
Aspect: West-Northwest
Elevation: 4000’ at crown, 2800′ at runout
Slope Angle: 40 degrees
Slope Characteristics: Planar slope, below convex roll, sparse trees, alders, tundra in start zone.
Code: SS-ASu-R1-D2-I
Backcountry Avalanche Forecast
The CNFAC rated the avalanche danger at MODERATE above treeline, with wind slab avalanches as the primary concern. The forecast mentioned ‘Wind slabs are expected to be around 1′ deep and located along ridgelines and convex features at upper elevations. We expect them to be stubborn for a person to trigger but still possible in steeper terrain’
Weather and Snowpack Summary
The Lynx Creek drainage is accessed from the Johnson Pass trailhead, and is almost entirely motorized access in the winter. This area had very recently been opened to motorized use. As a result, there was virtually no snowpack information for this specific area prior to the incident. For the Turnagain Pass area in general, the CNFAC had been monitoring a layer of weak snow that was buried during a major storm event in the first week of January. With an exceptionally wet January, the layer had been buried by 16.8″ Snow Water Equivalent (SWE) at the nearby Center Ridge Snotel site during the weeks leading up to the event. The layer had not produced any major avalanche activity in the Turnagain Pass zone despite multiple storm systems contributing 2-3″ SWE over 48 hours or less, and as a result the CNFAC had dropped the layer as a concern for Turnagain Pass. There were no other known problems within the snowpack, but since the Johnson Pass area had almost no information, it was mentioned specifically in the forecast as a potentially problematic zone:
“In areas with a thinner snowpack, such as near Crow Creek in Girdwood or on the southern end of Turnagain Pass near Johnson Pass Trailhead buried weak layers may exist in the snowpack. So we recommend taking some time to evaluate the snowpack before committing to steep terrain.”
A major storm impacted Southcentral Alaska Jan. 24-26, bringing 2.4″ SWE to Turnagain Pass. This equalled roughly 2′ snow at upper elevations over that weekend, and prompted an Avalanche Warning for January 25-26. Temperatures plummeted following the storm, along with strong northwesterly winds, averaging 15 to 20 mph in the Turnagain Pass area. Winds were beginning to subside in the general area on the day of the event, but members of the group involved in the accident mentioned observing sustained winds along the ridgetop immediately prior to the avalanche. It is highly unlikely that the avalanche in this accident report involved anything more than windblown snow on a new/old snow interface from the week leading up to the event.
Accident Summary
There were two parties in the East Groundhog area at the time of the accident. The party that the injured skier was traveling with will be referred to as ‘Party 1’ and the second group will be referred to as ‘Party 2’. There were six members in Party 1 and two members in Party 2.
Four members of Party 1 gained the ridgeline via snowmachine while two members watched from below. The four members on the ridge divided into two groups to descend, with Skiers 1 and 2 and Snowboarder 1 on top of one terrain feature, and Snowboarder 2 on top of an adjacent feature. Skier 3 and Snowboarder 3 had a clear view of the rest of the group from below. Snowboarder 1 descended first without incident, and was followed immediately after by Skier 1. Skier 1 skied closely to the previous set of tracks. Skier 1 had descended approximately 200 vertical feet before triggering an avalanche about 20 feet to the right of the first set of tracks. The skier’s skis released almost immediately and the skier was carried in the moving slab. The skier was able to slow himself just enough to let most of the debris fall below him, but was carried for the length of the path, including through a rocky section just above the apron. Snowboarder 1 was able to arrest Skier 1 as he slid down the apron at the bottom of the path.
Rescue Summary
Snowboarder 2 walked back to a snowmachine that was parked on the ridge and descended along the track the group had used to ascend. He picked up Snowboarder 3 at the bottom and reached Skier 1 approximately 4 minutes after the avalanche. Snowboarder 2 immediately began administering backcountry medical care. Skier 2 began descend the same previous ascent route, where Skier 3 picked him up along the way. The two reached Skier 1 approximately 10 minutes after the avalanche.
Party 1 established contact with Party 2 immediately after the avalanche. When it became clear that Skier 1 would need a helicopter evacuation, Rider 1 from Party 2 rode up to the ridge to get phone service and initiate emergency medical services. This phone call was made approximately 20 minutes after the avalanche, at roughly 13:50. Rider 1 stayed in cell service to maintain contact with the Alaska State Troopers, and also maintained radio communication with Party 1. Rider 1 clearly stated that it was not possible to safely land a helicopter in the complex terrain where Skier 1 had come to a rest, and the rescue would require a hoist.
A helicopter from a private emergency air medical transport provider flew over the scene at approximately 15:45, circling the scene twice before confirming they were unable to land and exiting the area. The Air National Guard arrived on scene at approximately 18:15 and had the patient loaded by hoist and evacuated by approximately 18:45.
